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Negative Investment in China: Financing Constraints and 
Restructuring versus Growth 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper addresses an interesting phenomenon in China’s investment pattern: despite high 
aggregate investment and remarkable economic growth, negative investment is commonly 
found at the microeconomic level. Using a large firm-level dataset, mainly made up of 
unlisted companies, we show that private firms undertake negative investment in order to 
raise capital. We also find that, owing to over-investment and mis-investment in the past, 
state-owned firms have had to restructure by getting rid of obsolete capital in the face of 
increasing competition and hardening budget constraints. Finally, rapid economic growth 
counterweighs both effects for all types of firms, with a larger impact in the private and 
foreign sectors. Thus, the needs to redeploy resources and to overcome capital market 
imperfections help to explain the negative investment of many Chinese firms. 
 
JEL classification: G3; O16; O53 
Keywords: Negative investment; Financial constraints; Industrial restructuring; Economic 
transition; China 
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I. Introduction 
Economic development is often characterized by a process of Schumpeterian creative 
destruction, in which new ideas, demands, products and processes render others obsolete. The 
capital stock has to be continuously churned to align it with changing market signals. This 
process can be important in developing countries that move from industrial protection to 
reliance on comparative advantage, or those, such as China, that move from inefficient state 
ownership to reliance on a private sector. Economic development can also be characterized 
by imperfect capital markets, so causing misallocation of investment and inducing responsive 
behavior by both favored and disfavored firms. Such behavior is particularly relevant in 
China, which has been slow to reform its state-dominated financial system. These two 
characteristics – redeployment of resources and imperfection of the capital market – can 
assist understanding of the phenomenon of negative investment in China, which is the 
objective of this paper.  
During the last four decades, China’s investment rate has been remarkably high. At 
the aggregate level, gross capital formation has averaged a fairly steady 40 percent of GDP 
over the entire reform period, the fixed capital formation component of which has risen, from 
an average of 29 percent between 1978 and 1992 to an average of 39 percent between 1993 
and 2014 (World Development Indicators, 2016)1. The high aggregate investment rate and 
dramatic investment-generated improvements in productivity and technology have been 
viewed as the main driving forces behind China’s remarkable growth over the reform period. 
Investment accounts for about two-thirds of the growth differences between China and Sub-
Saharan Africa (Ding and Knight, 2009). Some have argued that high investment has been a 
necessary condition for China’s growth success (e.g. Knight and Ding, 2012, ch. 6; Guariglia 
and Yang, 2016)2. Nevertheless, at the micro level, China has also experienced much 
negative investment. In line with this argument, using data from Thomson Financial for listed 
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companies over the period 2000-2007, we observe that although Chinese listed firms exhibit 
a rate of aggregate investment of 15.73%, they also show a rate of negative investment of 
11.80%3. Yet, Chinese listed companies are not alone in having a high rate of negative 
investment coupled with a high investment rate. For instance, rates of aggregate investment 
(negative investment) were 13.14% (14.97%) in Singapore; 19.07% (13.45%) in the 
Philippines; 13.86% (11.30%) in South Korea; 12.32% (15.74%) in Malaysia; 17.41% 
(9.30%) in Taiwan; and 16.93% (7.62%) in Thailand4.  
It is, however, noteworthy that, compared to other economies, the Chinese listed 
sector is quite small. It is therefore important to focus on unlisted companies in China5. Our 
comprehensive nationwide annual dataset of about 60,000 mainly unlisted Chinese 
manufacturing firms covering the period 2000-2007 shows that, on the one hand, annual 
investment averaged 9% of fixed capital stock and 22% of value added, but, on the other 
hand, a staggering 32% of the firm-year observations in the sample actually showed negative 
investment. This number is more than double that observed for listed companies. It can be 
explained bearing in mind  that unlisted firms are more likely to be characterized by adverse 
financial attributes such as a short track record, poor solvency, and low real assets compared 
to the quoted firms, which are typically large, financially healthy, long-established companies 
with good credit ratings (Guariglia, 2008). The combination of high investment for Chinese 
firms in aggregate and divestment among individual, and especially unlisted, firms presents 
an interesting phenomenon, which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been investigated6. 
Using the firm-level dataset referred to above, we fill this gap in the literature by providing, 
for the first time, answers to the following two broad research questions. First, why do 
Chinese firms divest? Second, why do some firms divest more than others?  
We find that negative investment by private firms is mainly due to external financial 
constraints: they need to obtain funds in order to survive and grow. State-owned enterprises 
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(SOEs) divest mainly for inefficiency or restructuring reasons: they need to eliminate 
obsolete capital in the face of rising competition or other pressures to become efficient. The 
fact that firms are growing fast offsets both of these incentives for negative investment, 
particularly so in the case of the - more dynamic - private and foreign firms. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the 
relevant theories and empirical evidence on negative investment. Section 3 describes China’s 
institutional context. Section 4 outlines possible motives for divestment in China. Section 5 
sets out our baseline specifications and empirical methodology. Section 6 describes our data 
and sample, and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 7 reports and interprets our 
estimation results. Section 8 provides a number of robustness tests. Section 9 draws 
conclusions. 
II. Literature review 
Compared with the enormous literature on positive investment by firms, negative investment 
is under-researched. Moreover, the negative investment literature focuses largely on 
developed countries characterized by mature financial markets. According to Gadad and 
Thomas (2004), divestment can take many forms: sell-off, spin-off, equity carve-out, and 
management buyout7. Given that almost all firms in our sample are not listed in the stock 
market, our survey focuses on the first form of negative investment, the sell-off.  
The finance literature has identified several reasons for negative investment, among 
which the following four are most prominent: the financing explanation, whereby divestment 
can raise capital without recourse to the capital market; the efficiency explanation, whereby 
assets are transferred to firms which can operate them more productively; the focus 
explanation, according to which divestment may permit concentration on core activities; the 
liquidity explanation, which stresses the need for assets to be liquid if divestment is to occur; 
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and the defensive restructuring explanation, according to which asset divestment is a 
response to rapid economic transition. This explanation may well be intertwined with the 
efficiency explanation. We will focus on the financing and efficiency explanations, which are 
most relevant for understanding the coexistence of widespread negative investment and huge 
positive investment among Chinese firms, and briefly discuss other explanations, which, 
however, are not tested owing to our data limitations. 
A. The financing explanation 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that selling assets can be more attractive and cheaper than 
debt rescheduling and issuing new securities as a way of raising funds to meet debt 
obligations. Asset sales can in fact reduce conflicts between creditors, control agency costs, 
and alleviate the problem of informational asymmetry between the firm and outsiders.   
Based on a sample of US asset sales, Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) argue that 
managers sell assets to obtain funds when alternative funding is either more expensive or 
unavailable. As highly-leveraged or poorly-performing firms find it expensive to use capital 
markets owing to adverse selection costs (Myers and Majluf, 1984) or agency costs of 
managerial discretion (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990), they are more likely to sell assets.  
Using a US dataset, Hovakimian and Titman (2006) find that cash obtained from asset 
sales is an important determinant of corporate investment and that the sensitivity of 
investment to proceeds from asset sales is significantly stronger for firms that are likely to be 
financially constrained. A similar result is found by Borisova and Brown (2013), who link the 
proceeds from asset sales with corporate R&D investment in the US.  
B. The efficiency explanation 
Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987) argue that managers retain only assets for which they have a 
comparative advantage, and that they sell assets if another party can manage them more 
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efficiently. Investigating cases for both partial or total sell-offs in the US8, they find that asset 
sales are associated with the movement of resources to higher-valued uses and that sellers 
capture some of the resulting gains. 
Using a US firm-level database, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) find that assets are 
more likely to be sold when they are less productive than their industry benchmarks, when 
the selling division is less productive, when the selling firm has more productive divisions in 
other industries, and when the economy is undergoing positive demand shocks. The timing of 
sales and the pattern of efficiency gains suggest that divestments tend to improve the 
allocation of resources. Also focusing on US firms, Warusawitharana (2008) finds that it is 
less profitable firms who typically sell assets, whilst Yang (2008) argues that asset sales are 
driven by declines in productivity brought by shocks.  
C. Other explanations 
Both Berger and Ofek (1995) and John and Ofek (1995) emphasize focus as a motive for 
divestment: selling an unrelated asset leads to an increase in focus and to more efficient 
operation of the core business.  
Schlingemann, Stulz and Walkling (2002) emphasize the role of asset liquidity in 
determining which assets are divested in the pursuit of firm objectives. They argue that more 
liquid assets are more likely to be divested.  
According to Carlin et al. (2001), divestment can arise for different reasons in 
transition economies, and asset divestment can be forced on a firm when its survival is 
threatened. In other words, divestment may indicate restructuring and downsizing by firms 
that have difficulties in adapting to a new market environment. Using a World Bank survey 
covering 25 transition countries, they find that SOEs and old firms are significantly more 
likely to engage in defensive restructuring through labor shedding and plant closures, while 
firms with market power are less likely to do so.  
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In summary, the literature provides various motivations for firms to divest. Asset sales 
enable financially healthy firms to restructure and to improve efficiency by selling assets to 
more productive users or by selling assets unrelated to the core business. Asset sales may 
permit financially constrained firms to raise capital if debt and equity markets are unattractive 
or unavailable. Asset liquidity plays a role in determining which assets are divested. In 
transition economies, asset divestment may assist defensive restructuring or relieve financial 
distress9. 
 
III. China’s institutional context 
Our explanations for the presence of negative investment must take into account the Chinese 
context. China had a centrally planned economy until economic reform began in 1978. A 
distinguishing feature of China’s institutional reform is the emergence of new forms of 
ownership.  
The Chinese industrial sector was initially dominated by state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), whose directive was to fulfill production quotas, to transfer profits to government, 
and to provide life-long employment. Deng Xiaoping’s ‘southern tour’ of 1992 formally gave 
the green light to capitalist development. The Company Law adopted in 1994 provided a 
uniform legal framework into which all of the ownership forms fit, signaling the introduction 
of more clearly defined property rights and the start of the dramatic institutional change 
involved in the rapid downsizing of the state sector. Specifically, small SOEs and urban 
collective enterprises (UCEs) were closed, privatized, or turned into shareholding entities  
increasingly dominated by private owners (Lin and Zhu, 2001; Garnaut et al., 2005), whilst 
larger SOEs were incorporated under state control (Hsieh and Song, 2015). This is known as 
the ‘Grasp the large, let go of the small’ reform 10. However, SOEs remain dominant in 
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energy, natural resources and a few strategic or monopolistic sectors that are controlled and 
protected by central and local governments.  
Figure 1 shows the shares of three different agents in investment in fixed assets over 
the period 1980-2008. SOEs accounted for the bulk of fixed investment until the early 1990s, 
after which the structure of investment altered dramatically. Between 1992 and 2008, the 
investment share of SOEs fell from two-thirds to one-third, whereas the share of private 
enterprises climbed to two-thirds. This has been viewed as a positive development, given that 
the average return on capital in SOEs was well below that in the private sector and many 
SOEs continued to make losses (Dougherty and Herd, 2005; Knight and Ding, 2010).  
In line with these trends, our data set shows a substantial growth in the importance of 
private and foreign firms and a corresponding decline in the importance of state-owned firms 
over our period of study. Specifically, total real value added, based on majority ownership, of 
private firms rose from 47.2% to 51.2% of total manufacturing between 2000 and 2007, and 
the share of foreign firms rose from 16.6% to 20.1%, whereas the share of SOEs fell from 
31.4% to 24.4%. This reallocation of resources in manufacturing occurred because private 
firms were generally more productive and more profitable than SOEs.  
However, the reallocation was constrained by financial frictions: Domestic private 
firms had normally to finance their investments through internal saving whereas SOEs had 
access to cheap and subsidised funds, which helped to keep some of them going (Song, 
Storesletten and Zilibotti, 2011). The government has in fact intervened, and continues to 
intervene in bank lending to favor the state sector (Riedel, Jin and Gao, 2007). Despite the 
gradual reform of the banking sector, bank loans constitute a major share of investment 
financing only for SOEs, while private firms are generally discriminated against by the 
formal financial system (Allen, Qian and Qian, 2005; Knight and Ding, 2010; Guariglia, Liu 
and Song, 2011; Song et al., 2011). Although these problems have become less severe since 
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2000 (Guariglia and Poncet, 2008), private investment has remained at a borrowing 
disadvantage (Haggard and Huang, 2008) 11. 
 
IV. Possible motives for divestment in China 
According to our first explanation (the financing motive), given the inefficient nature of the 
Chinese financial system, some firms may need to sell off assets in order to generate the 
funds required to pursue their objectives when other sources of finance are limited or costly. 
This explanation is likely to be particularly relevant to private firms, which, as documented 
by Song, et al. (2011), are typically discriminated against by the banking sector. We test this 
explanation by examining the link between two financial variables (cash flow and leverage) 
and the probability of negative investment and, if it occurs at all, the amount of negative 
investment.  
Models of capital market imperfections imply that external finance is more costly than 
internal finance (Myers, 1984; Hubbard, 1998). For given levels of investment opportunities, 
information costs, and market interest rates, firms with higher cash flow (or, more generally, 
higher net worth) should invest more, and therefore have a lower probability, or lower 
amount, of negative investment. We therefore expect to observe a negative relationship 
between cash flow and negative investment. It should be noted, however, that cash flow is an 
imperfect proxy for changes in net worth, as it might also contain information about expected 
future profitability or, more generally, demand factors, which may be relevant to investment 
decisions even in the absence of capital market imperfections. Thus, the finding of a negative 
and significant association between cash flow and negative investment cannot be interpreted 
as necessarily indicating financial constraints (Cummins, Hassett and Oliner, 2006; Kaplan 
and Zingales, 1997; 2000). This is especially the case when investment opportunities are 
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omitted or mis-measured by standard measures such as Tobin’s Q (Bond et al., 2003; 
Carpenter and Guariglia, 2008)12.  
In the light of these considerations, we introduce a second financial variable, namely 
leverage, to test the financing explanation. Leverage can be seen as a measure of the amount 
of external finance used by firms. On the one hand, high leverage may be interpreted as 
indicating high debt capacity or low external financial constraints (Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen, 2000; Hovakimian, 2009): one would therefore expect leverage to be negatively 
related with the probability and/or the amount of negative investment. On the other hand, 
high leverage may indicate a firm’s poor financial performance (Lang et al., 1995; Kaplan 
and Zingales, 1997). In line with this argument, Denis and Shome (2005) show that the 
decision to downsize is positively related to firms’ debt ratios. Both arguments are relevant in 
the Chinese context. The former matters for private firms, which have limited access to 
formal bank credit and may have to divest for financing purposes. For these firms, a high 
leverage ratio indicates high debt capacity, which reduces the need for negative investment. 
We therefore expect to observe a negative relationship between the probability and/or the 
amount of negative investment and leverage in the private sector. By contrast, the latter 
explanation holds for SOEs: the abundance of external funds as a result of soft budget 
constraints in the state sector can be viewed as an indicator of poor financial performance. 
Loss-making SOEs receive ready assistance from banks to help keep them afloat, but this 
weakens their balance sheets, which may in turn increase the pressure on them to cut back on 
investment. A positive relationship between leverage and negative investment is therefore 
expected for SOEs.  
According to our second explanation (the efficiency motive), firms may show negative 
investment for efficiency reasons. This explanation is likely to be particularly relevant to 
SOEs as they are typically less efficient than non-state firms and hence more likely to 
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downsize for efficiency reasons. We test whether this is the case by examining the link 
between firm productivity and negative investment. We expect the relationship to be negative 
for all types of firms, and larger in absolute value for SOEs. 
A distinguishing feature of the Chinese economy is its rapid growth: the growth rate 
of GDP per capita averaged 8.6% per annum over the three decades of economic reform 
(World Development Indicators, 2016). Moreover, the growth of real sales in our sample 
averaged 11.6% per annum over the period 2000-2007. This remarkable growth performance 
creates vast opportunities for investment. In the investment literature, Blomström, Lipsey and 
Zejan (1996) argue that growth induces subsequent capital formation more than capital 
formation induces subsequent growth. Thus, our third explanation (the growth motive) 
predicts a negative relationship between growth and negative investment. To the best of our 
knowledge, the role of firm growth has not been explored in the literature on negative 
investment.  
In summary, to understand why Chinese firms divest, we investigate the extent to 
which firm financing, efficiency, and growth influence negative investment within each 
ownership group. Although we test them separately for convenience, some of our 
explanations are not mutually exclusive. For instance, the efficiency and financing motives 
may be intertwined. We will therefore conduct a number of robustness tests for this purpose.  
V. Baseline specification and estimation methodology 
A. Baseline specification 
In order to test for the financing, efficiency, and growth explanations for negative investment, 
we start by estimating the following regression: 
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𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 4𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 
+ 𝛼5𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼6𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼8𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 
   +𝑣𝑡 + 𝑣𝑗 + 𝑣𝑡𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                       (1) 
where the dependent variable, 𝑁𝐼, represents negative investment. Unlike other studies in the 
literature, our dataset does not contain any information on asset sales. We therefore follow 
Liu and Siu (2011) and define the investment of firm 𝑖 at year 𝑡 (𝐼𝑖,𝑡) as the book value of 
tangible fixed assets at time 𝑡 (𝐾𝑖,𝑡) minus the book value of tangible fixed assets at time 𝑡 − 1 
(𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1) plus depreciation at time 𝑡 (𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖,𝑡), i.e. 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐾𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖,𝑡
13. Negative 
investment occurs when 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 < 0. Thus, our dependent variable is gross, not net, negative 
investment, which must be the result of selling or scrapping assets. 
When focusing on the probability of 𝑁𝐼, the dependent variable is a binary variable 
taking value of one if there is 𝑁𝐼, and zero otherwise. When examining the determinants of 
the amount of 𝑁𝐼, the dependent variable is a censored variable which is equal to zero if the 
firm does not have 𝑁𝐼, and takes the value of the actual amount otherwise. 
The independent variables in equation (1) include proxies aimed at testing the 
financing, efficiency, and growth explanations, as well as some control variables. 
Specifically, 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 are included to test for the financing 
explanation. 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 is defined as the lagged cash flow to tangible fixed assets ratio. It 
is included as a proxy for changes in net worth. The second financial variable included in 
equation (1), 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1, is the lagged ratio of total debt over total assets. Both financial 
variables are lagged once to alleviate the potential endogeneity problem in the divestment 
regressions. Following the arguments outlined in Section 4, we expect 𝛼1 to be negative for 
all firms and 𝛼2 to be negative for private firms and positive for SOEs.  
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             To test the efficiency explanation, we compute firm-level total factor productivity 
(𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1) using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method, where intermediate inputs are used 
to proxy for unobserved productivity in order to alleviate both the selection bias and the 
simultaneity bias (between input choices and productivity shocks). Similar to the two 
financing variables, we lag our TFP measure once. According to the efficiency explanation, 
we expect 𝛼3  to be negative. 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 is a proxy for the output growth of the firm, 
and is used to test for the growth explanation, which suggests that 𝛼4 < 0. 
As for the control variables, we include firm size, firm age, the asset tangibility ratio, 
and an export dummy in our baseline model. 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is defined as the lagged value of 
the natural logarithm of real total assets. It can be important in explaining financing choices 
for corporate investment. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), size may serve as an 
inverse proxy for the extent of informational asymmetries between the firm’s insiders and 
external finance providers: smaller firms are expected to face higher hurdles when raising 
external capital, whereas large firms, which are assumed to be more diversified and less 
prone to bankruptcy, can borrow more easily. We predict that firm size does not play an 
important role in SOEs’ 𝑁𝐼 decisions owing to their soft budget constraints, but might be 
important for non-state firms. 
Firm age may also serve as a proxy for the wedge between the costs of external and 
internal capital (Oliner and Rudebusch, 1992). Moreover, younger firms are more likely to 
face problems of asymmetric information and may therefore be more financially constrained 
compared to their older counterparts. On the other hand, younger firms are generally more 
dynamic and efficient than old ones. In the Chinese context, older firms may be less efficient 
and more likely to have NI for restructuring reasons, whereas younger firms may be more 
likely to have NI for funding reasons. 
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𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is defined as the lagged ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets. 
Firms with high asset tangibility are more likely to make a distress asset sale as it is easier to 
estimate their value. We therefore expect to observe a positive relationship between asset 
tangibility and 𝑁𝐼. 
 We use an export dummy (𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1) to capture the expected performance-
enhancing effects of export activities among Chinese firms. Consistent with widespread 
evidence that efficiency and exports are positively correlated in China (Kraay, 1999; Park et 
al., 2010), we expect that firms conducting export business are more likely not to have 𝑁𝐼 or 
to have less 𝑁𝐼.  
Lastly, we include time dummies to account for macroeconomic fluctuations or 
business cycle effects (𝑣𝑡), industry dummies to capture industry-specific effects (𝑣𝑗), and the 
interactions of time and industry dummies to account for industry-specific shifts in 
investment demand or expectations (𝑣𝑡𝑗)
14.  
B. Estimation methodology 
We first estimate a pooled probit model to examine the factors that determine the probability 
of negative investment for each ownership group. We then use a pooled tobit model to 
estimate the determinants of the amount of negative investment in the divesting firms. Both 
models allow us to control for unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity by using cluster-robust 
standard errors, clustered by firms15. 
To control for the potential endogeneity of our regressors, all variables except firm 
age are lagged once in our regression, the aim being to alleviate simultaneity bias. As a 
robustness test, we also estimate our equations using an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach. 
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VI. Data and descriptive statistics 
A. Data 
Firm-level data offer several advantages for the study of investment or divestment behavior: 
the problem of aggregation over firms is eliminated in estimation, and the heterogeneity 
among various types of firms can be taken into account (Bond and Van Reenen, 2007). This 
is particularly important for China owing to the institutional differences between state and 
non-state enterprises. 
We use data drawn from the annual accounting reports filed with the National Bureau 
of Statistics (NBS) by industrial firms over the period 2000-200716. The original sample 
contains more than 300,000 mainly unlisted firms, including all SOEs and other types of 
enterprises with annual sales of five million yuan (about $750,000) or more. These firms 
operate in the manufacturing and mining sectors and are located in all 31 Chinese provinces 
or province-equivalent municipal cities. We dropped observations with negative sales; as well 
as observations with negative total assets minus total fixed assets; total assets minus liquid 
assets; and accumulated depreciation minus current depreciation. Firms that lacked complete 
records on our main regression variables were also dropped. To control for the potential 
influence of outliers, we excluded observations in the one percent tails of each of the 
regression variables. Finally, we removed all firms with fewer than five years of consecutive 
observations. 
The NBS data contain a continuous measure of ownership, which is based on the 
fraction of paid-in-capital contributed by six different types of investors, namely the state; 
foreign investors (excluding those from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan); investors from 
Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan17; legal entities18; individuals; and collective investors19. We 
group all foreign firms (from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and other parts of the world) into 
a single foreign category; and all firms owned by legal entities and individuals into a private 
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category20. Thus our firms fall into four broad categories - state-owned, collective, private, 
and foreign - based on the shares of paid-in-capital contributed by the four types of investors 
each year.  
As in Guariglia et al. (2011), we group firms according to the majority average 
ownership shares. For instance, if the average share of capital paid-in by private investors 
over the period 2000-2007 is greater than 50%, then the firm is classified as privately owned. 
Table A2 in the Data Appendix presents the distribution of observations by ownership. Our 
sample is dominated by private firms: 62.42% of firms are classified as privately-owned. 
SOEs, collective firms and foreign firms represent respectively 7.62%, 8.20% and 17.75% of 
our sample. Table A2 shows an interesting pattern of the evolution of ownership over the 
eight-year period. The proportion of SOEs in our sample declined dramatically, from 11.80% 
in 2000 to 5.28% in 2007. A similar pattern holds for collective firms, whose share declined 
from 11.06% to 6.93%. By contrast, the share of private firms climbed from 52.04% to 
66.25%. The share of foreign firms remained roughly stable at between 17.23% and 19.49%. 
Privatization of small SOEs and TVEs became significant after 1998 (Haggard and Huang, 
2008). Our dataset reflects the restructuring process involved in the shrinkage of the state and 
collective sectors and the expansion of the private sector. 
Considering that the year 2000 is used to construct lagged variables, the final dataset 
that we use in estimation covers 63,069 mainly unlisted firms, which yield 270,691 firm-year 
observations over the period 2001-2007. The sample is unbalanced: the structure of the panel 
can be seen in Table A3 in the Data Appendix. The number of observations ranges from a 
minimum of 17,744 in 2001 to a maximum of 51,877 in 2005. Entry and exit of firms take 
place during our sample period: fewer than 30 percent of firms have the full 7-year 
accounting information. The active entry and exit of firms are the consequence of the 
18 
 
 
 
enterprise restructuring that began in the mid-1990s, and can be viewed as a source of 
dynamism (see, for instance, Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang, 2012).  
B. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for some key variables. We focus this discussion on 
means. Fixed asset investment as a proportion of tangible fixed assets averages 8.8% in our 
sample. The investment rate is lowest for SOEs (2.5%) and highest for private firms (10.0%), 
followed by foreign firms (8.8%). The proportion of firms that have negative fixed asset 
investment is 32.1% for the full sample: it is highest for SOEs (43.4%) and lowest for foreign 
firms (29.7%) and private firms (31.0%)21. For divesting firms, 𝑁𝐼 amounts to 22.2% of 
tangible fixed assets for the full sample, being highest for private firms (23.6%) and lowest 
for SOEs (16.4%). Thus, 𝑁𝐼 is a widespread phenomenon among all types of firms in China, 
suggesting the presence of dramatic structural changes in the industrial sector. 
Turning to the financial variables included in our baseline model, SOEs have the 
lowest cash flow ratio (15.1%), and the highest leverage ratio (63.3%). By contrast, foreign 
firms have the highest cash flow ratio (41.2%) and the lowest leverage ratio (47.7%). The 
ratios of private firms lie between those of SOEs and foreign firms. The co-existence of high 
leverage and low cash flow in the state sector is initial evidence in favor of easy credit and 
soft budget constraints enjoyed by SOEs22.  
SOEs have the lowest TFP (3.1) and foreign firms the highest (5.0), followed by 
private firms (3.4) and then collective firms (3.2). It is apparent that SOEs remain the least 
efficient. SOEs also have the lowest rate of sales growth (3.8%), whereas private firms have 
the highest (11.2%). Foreign firms also have a high growth rate (8.4%). The sales growth rate 
of collective firms (7.2%) is higher than SOEs’ but lower than that of private and foreign 
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firms. Thus private and foreign firms are the faster growing groups, whereas SOEs are, 
relatively speaking, stagnating. 
SOEs are generally older and larger than enterprises in the non-state sectors, and they 
have a higher asset tangibility ratio. Collective firms and SOEs are least involved in the 
exporting business: respectively only 14.8% and 16.1% of these firms export, compared to 
72.9% and 29.5%, respectively for foreign and private firms. 
It is noteworthy that collective firms are intermediate between SOEs and private 
enterprises in several characteristics, including their negative net investment ratio, TFP and 
sales growth. This might reflect the facts that they have a legacy of having been like SOEs, 
but have, in recent years, reformed further than (remaining) SOEs, being more subject to hard 
budgets and operating effectively as private enterprises (Naughton, 2007).  
When separating the sample into firms with negative investment and those with 
positive investment (Table A4, Panel A in the Data Appendix), we observe that, for all 
ownership groups, firms with positive investment significantly outperform their counterparts 
with negative investment in terms of internal funds, productivity, investment opportunities, 
and exporting behavior (as proxied by cash flow, TFP, sales growth, and the export dummy, 
respectively)23. More interesting results are found for leverage: in the state and collective 
sectors, firms with negative investment have higher leverage. By contrast, higher leverage is 
observed for firms with positive investment in the private and foreign sectors. This provides 
initial evidence in favor of our explanation according to which high leverage can be seen as 
an indicator of poor financial performance (which may lead to 𝑁𝐼) in the state sector, and of 
good economic prospect (which encourages investment) in the private sector. Finally, firms 
reporting 𝑁𝐼 tend to be smaller and older in all ownership groups. 
In sum, the descriptive statistics show that over our sample period, SOEs were the 
least financially constrained, the least efficient, and the slowest growing. Given their easy 
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access to credit, reflected in their high leverage ratio, the poor performance of SOEs reflects 
inefficiencies in capital allocation and a sluggish response to market forces. It is therefore not 
surprising to observe that many firms in the state sector have negative investment. By 
contrast, private and foreign firms were the most profitable, efficient, and dynamic sectors. 
Collective firms had good financial performance but fewer growth opportunities. These 
differences make it plausible to hypothesize that firms owned by different agents have 
negative investment for different reasons. In the sub-section that follows, we aim at testing 
whether this is indeed the case. 
VII. Empirical results 
A. Probit results 
Table 2 reports pooled probit estimates of our baseline model, estimated separately for SOEs, 
collective, private, and foreign firms. The marginal effect associated with cash flow is 
negative and significant for all four ownership groups, which accords with the financing 
explanation. In particular, a 10 percentage point lower cash flow ratio is associated with a 
0.79 percentage point higher probability of 𝑁𝐼 for SOEs. The corresponding figures for 
collective, private and foreign firms are: 0.54, 0.38, and 0.26, respectively24. We had 
expected the effect of cash flow to be weakest for SOEs, being the least financially 
constrained. This reverse result might be due to the fact that cash flow is more persistent for 
these firms, making it more informative about future profitability25.  
The leverage ratio displays an interesting pattern across ownership groups. Its 
marginal effect is significantly positive for SOEs, significantly negative for private firms, and 
insignificant for collective and foreign firms. For SOEs, a 10 percentage point higher 
leverage ratio is associated with a 0.53 percentage point higher probability of showing 𝑁𝐼. 
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Taking into account the fact that SOEs in general, and divesting SOEs in particular, have the 
highest leverage ratio, our regression result suggests that easy credit in previous years 
significantly impairs state firms’ financial performance, so that these firms may now have to 
cut back on investment in order to survive. On the contrary, for private firms, the probability 
of showing 𝑁𝐼 is 0.59 percentage points lower in the presence of a 10 percentage point higher 
leverage ratio. It appears that those private firms which have not only the incentive but also 
the ability to borrow are more likely to avoid 𝑁𝐼26. External finance does not affect the 
negative investment decisions of collective and foreign firms, perhaps because their links 
with local governments and international financial markets respectively may help them to 
obtain alternative sources of finance.  
The firm-level TFP measure has a significantly negative marginal effect for all 
ownership groups: firms are more likely to suffer 𝑁𝐼 when they are less productive. This is in 
line with the efficiency explanation. The marginal effect is greatest for SOEs: a 10 percentage 
point higher TFP is associated with a 0.21 percentage point lower probability of displaying 
𝑁𝐼. The corresponding figures for collective, private, and foreign firms are 0.14, 0.11, and 
0.06 percentage points, respectively. SOEs are generally less productive. The less productive 
among them – probably saddled with more over- or mis-investment in the past – have a 
stronger incentive to undertake 𝑁𝐼. This finding is consistent with our efficiency explanation, 
according to which it is the least efficient firms (SOEs) that are most likely to downsize for 
efficiency reasons27.   
The growth rate of real sales significantly reduces the probability of showing negative 
investment for all types of firms, with the largest marginal effects for private and foreign 
firms: in the presence of a 10 percentage point higher sales growth, we observe a 0.9 and 1.0 
percentage points lower probability respectively for these two groups of firms. This evidence 
supports our explanation that firm growth protects against negative investment. In their 
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negative investment decisions, private and foreign firms are more responsive to growth 
opportunities than are state and collective firms28. 
Turning to the control variables, the marginal effect associated with firm size is 
insignificant for SOEs and foreign firms, but it is significantly positive for collective and 
private firms. This is consistent with our prediction that their easy access to external finance 
insulates the negative investment decisions of SOEs from the influences of firm size. A 
similar argument applies to foreign firms who may access external finance through their 
parent companies (Manova, Wei and Zhang, 2011). By contrast, smaller collective and 
private firms are more likely to exhibit higher financial flexibility than their larger 
counterparts (Chow and Fung, 2000), and are therefore less likely to sell off assets.  
The marginal effect associated with firm age is positive and significant for all groups 
of firms. In China, firm age does not perform an efficient role in alleviating informational 
asymmetry, as it does in many developed financial markets. Instead, younger firms, being 
generally more dynamic and efficient, are less likely to undertake negative investment.    
Asset tangibility displays a positive and significant marginal effect for all firms. This 
can be explained considering that firms with high asset tangibility are more likely to make a 
distress asset sale as it is easier to estimate their value. The export dummy shows a 
statistically insignificant marginal effect for SOEs and collective firms, but a significantly 
negative marginal effect for private and foreign firms. The probability of negative investment 
declines when private and foreign firms have the opportunity to export. This is in line with 
Park et al. (2010) argument that exporting is a cause of superior performance. 
In summary, our probit results suggest that negative investment can be mainly 
explained by financial constraints in the case of private firms, and by inefficiency in the case 
of SOEs. Rapid firm growth counterweighs both effects for all types of firms. Moreover, a 
high probability of negative investment in the non-state sectors is associated with certain firm 
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characteristics: being old, large, having a high asset tangibility ratio, and lacking access to 
overseas markets29,30. 
B. Tobit results 
We next question which factors determine the amount of 𝑁𝐼 for those firms that actually do 
so. To answer this question, equation (1) is estimated using a pooled tobit model with cluster-
robust standard errors. The results are shown in Table 3. 
In line with the findings in the probit model, lower cash flow is associated with a 
higher level of 𝑁𝐼 for all firms. The leverage term is significantly negative for private firms, 
for which a 10 percentage point lower leverage ratio is associated with a 0.61 percentage 
point higher amount of 𝑁𝐼. The finding that lower levels of external finance produce more 𝑁𝐼 
confirms our explanation that the need for funds may explain 𝑁𝐼 by private firms. The tobit 
results on leverage differ from those of the probit in that the positive marginal effect for 
SOEs is no longer significant and collective firms now behave like private firms. 
Once again, the marginal effect associated with TFP is significantly negative for all 
firms, with the largest effect for SOEs: for these firms, a 10 percentage point lower TFP is 
associated with a 0.15 percentage point higher amount of 𝑁𝐼. This is consistent with our 
prediction that inefficiency is most important in explaining the massive 𝑁𝐼 of the state sector. 
The growth rate of sales also shows a negative and significant marginal effect for all 
firms: a higher sales growth is associated with less 𝑁𝐼. Larger marginal effects are found for 
private and foreign firms: a 10 percentage point higher sales growth is associated with a 0.57 
and 0.67 percentage points lower amount of 𝑁𝐼, respectively for these two groups of firms. 
This again suggests that the growth explanation holds most for the fastest-growing firms. 
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Several additional factors affect the amount of 𝑁𝐼 of the non-state firms. For instance, 
older firms with higher asset tangibility, and those which do not export, tend to show more 
𝑁𝐼. Overall the findings are consistent with our probit results. 
VIII. Robustness tests 
A. Alternative tests of the hypotheses 
To test the robustness of our results in the baseline model, we use some alternative measures 
of our main right-hand-side variables. We first introduce an alternative proxy for firms’ net 
worth in place of cash flow. One important component of the cash flow measure is 
depreciation. However there is no consensus as to whether depreciation is a source of funds, 
i.e. whether depreciation is a source of capital replacement or just one of the adjustments 
needed to convert the accrual net income to the cash provided from operating activities. As a 
robustness check for the financing explanation, we therefore deduct deprecation from cash 
flow, which gives a measure of net profit, and replace the lagged cash flow to tangible fixed 
assets ratio in equation (1) with the lagged net income to tangible fixed assets ratio. 
Next, in order to test the robustness of the efficiency explanation, we replace TFP 
with two widely-used alternative proxies for firm-level productivity. First, following 
McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) and Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), we calculate lagged 
value added per worker (𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 ), which is defined as the lagged value 
of total real value added divided by the number of workers. Second, we construct lagged 
average labor productivity (𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 ), which is given by lagged total real sales 
divided by number of workers. Neither of these measures has the desirable theoretical 
properties of TFP, but they may have desirable statistical properties since they are not 
computed from a regression.  
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       Lastly, to test the robustness of the growth explanation, we replace sales growth with 
different measures of growth. The first is the growth rate of value added 
(𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1). We are also interested in various sources of output growth, i.e., 
the rate of factor accumulation (proxied by the growth rates of total assets, 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1, 
and of employment, 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1), and the rate of improvement in firm 
productivity (the growth rate of TFP, 𝑇𝐹𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1).                                                             
We present summary statistics of these new variables in Table 4. Focusing on means, 
the net profit ratio is lowest for SOEs (6.3%), whereas for all non-state sectors, it is above 
24%. There is a sharp contrast in productivity between the state and non-state firms. SOEs 
have the lowest efficiency as measured by value added per worker and average labor 
productivity, and private and foreign firms are the most efficient. SOEs also have the lowest 
rates of all four growth measures, i.e. value added growth (-0.1%), total asset growth (0.8%), 
employment growth (-4.0%), and TFP growth (3.6%). On the other hand, private firms have 
the highest rates of value added growth (10.8%), total assets growth (9.7%), and TFP growth 
(8.9%). Foreign firms have the highest growth in employment (3.8%). In brief, these statistics 
confirm our previous findings that SOEs are the worst performers in terms of profitability, 
efficiency and growth, whereas private and foreign firms are the best performers. Splitting 
firms into those with negative and positive investment further shows that the former 
consistently underperform the latter in terms of profitability, productivity, and growth in all 
ownership groups (Table A4, Panel B in the Data Appendix).    
Table 5 reports the probit estimation results for the models including these new 
variables. To save space, we report only the marginal effects associated with the new 
variables. Net profit displays a very similar pattern to that of cash flow: for all firms, the 
probability of 𝑁𝐼 is lower, the more abundant the internal finance. Replacing cash flow with 
net profit does not change the features of the leverage term (not reported): excess leverage in 
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the state sector still worsens firms’ performance and is associated with a higher probability of 
showing  𝑁𝐼, whereas, for private firms, limited access to external finance creates incentives 
for 𝑁𝐼.  
The marginal effect on value added per worker is significantly negative for SOEs, 
insignificant for collective firms, and significantly positive for private and foreign firms. By 
contrast to the baseline model, the efficiency explanation of 𝑁𝐼 only holds for the state 
sector: for SOEs, a 10 percentage point lower value added per worker is associated with a 
0.23 percentage points higher probability of undertaking 𝑁𝐼. For private and foreign firms, 
the probability is higher, the higher the efficiency, implying that inefficiency, as proxied in 
this way, is not the cause of 𝑁𝐼. The use of average labor productivity tells the same story 
except that collective firms also have a significantly positive marginal effect. Thus, these 
robustness tests confirm that the efficiency explanation applies to SOEs but they also suggest 
that it does not apply to non-state firms. 
Growth of value added and of TFP do not affect the 𝑁𝐼 decisions of state and 
collective firms but are associated with lower probability of undertaking 𝑁𝐼 for private and 
foreign firms. In the case of real asset growth and employment growth, the marginal effect is 
significantly negative for all firms. Although there are minor differences according to the 
measure being used, our main finding of the growth explanation is robust: growth is generally 
associated with a lower chance of undertaking 𝑁𝐼, especially and, more consistently, for 
private and foreign firms than for state and collective firms.  
We also find that the baseline results for the control variables are robust when 
alternative financing, efficiency, and growth measures are used. Finally, our results also hold 
when the pooled tobit estimation method is employed. To save space we do not report these 
results, which are available upon request. 
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B. Instrumental variable methods  
Our method of lagging the right-hand-side variables once might not be sufficient to alleviate 
potential endogeneity concerns. As a further robustness test, we therefore use the 
instrumental variable (IV) method to test our baseline model specification. We instrument all 
financing, efficiency, growth, asset tangibility, export, and firm size variables using their own 
values lagged twice. Both probit and tobit IV models are estimated. To save space, we report 
only the results of the former in Table 6. 
The results relative to the variables representing our three explanations are generally 
consistent with those of the baseline model. One minor difference lies in the control variables 
of firm age and size. After being instrumented, the marginal effect of firm size becomes 
significantly positive only for private firms, suggesting that firm size is not important in 
determining the 𝑁𝐼 decisions of the other types of firms. A similar story holds for firm age, 
which is significant and positive only for private and foreign firms. These results strengthen 
our argument that the easy access of SOEs to external finance makes size and age irrelevant 
to their 𝑁𝐼 decisions. Only in the private and foreign sectors are smaller and younger firms 
more likely to outperform their counterparts, and therefore less likely to show 𝑁𝐼. In brief, 
the instrumental variable results provide evidence that the baseline model findings are robust. 
C. Further robustness tests 
Since explanations for NI are not mutually exclusive, more robustness tests are conducted to 
provide additional evidence in favour of particular explanations. First, in order to shed further 
light on the efficiency motive of NI, we examine whether firms’ productivity improves after 
making a NI. In Table 7, we report mean and median values of TFP in the year preceding (-1) 
and the year following (+1) a year characterized by the presence or absence of NI.  We define 
group one (G1) as the group of firms which make a NI in year t, whilst not showing NI in 
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year t+1; and group two (G2) as the group of firms not showing NI in either year t or t+1. We 
observe that the TFP of all types of firms is higher in the year after a NI is made than in the 
year before it is made. Moreover, when comparing G1 and G2, the percentage change of TFP 
is the largest for SOEs. Considering that SOEs have the lowest TFP, this evidence suggests 
that the efficiency motive works for all types of firms, but more markedly for SOEs.  
Second, when testing for the financing motive, we interpret high leverage as an 
indicator of access to external finance, which implies a lower need to divest to finance 
operations (especially for private firms). However, an alternative argument is that high 
leverage implies a higher need to repay debt, and thus a higher need to make a distress asset 
sale when debt obligations become due, if internal funds such as cash flow or profits turn out 
to be low in a particular year. To test for this second possibility, we include in our model for 
the probability of undertaking NI an interaction term between leverage and a high cash flow 
dummy ( 𝐶𝐹_ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ), which is equal to 1 in a given year if a firm’s cash flow lies in the top 
three quarters of the distribution of the cash flow of all firms belonging to the same industry 
as that firm in that year, and 0 otherwise. If high leverage suggests a high need to repay debt, 
one would expect the marginal effect associated with leverage to be positive and that 
associated with the interaction term to be negative. The results are presented in Table 8. We 
observe that the marginal effects associated with the interaction terms are insignificant, which 
does not support the argument that the high leverage is associated with a high need to repay 
debt. However, our key finding of the opposite impact of leverage on the probability of NI 
between SOEs and private firms remains intact, supporting our claim that the financing 
motive works for private firms but not for the state sector. Our results are robust when 
alternative definitions are used for the high cash flow dummy31. 
Another important issue in our analysis is the definition of ownership groups. The use 
of average share of paid-in capital by different owners over the period of 2000-07 is useful to 
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mitigate the potential problem of measurement error. However, it omits some interesting 
patterns of ownership transition during the sample period. It is possible that firms divest or 
invest strategically before or after changing ownership class. To tackle such problems, we 
first use the ownership classification made on the basis of ownership shares immediately 
before the sample period begins (in 2000), so that the ownership is not endogenous to the act 
of divestment. Secondly, we use the ownership classification made on the basis of the share 
of capital paid-in by various owner categories in each year, which allows for the dynamics of 
ownership changes. In other words, each firm is allowed to transit from one ownership group 
to another during the sample period. The results are reported in Tables 9(a) and 9(b), 
respectively. Our main findings remain robust to these alternative ways of classifying 
ownership.  
Our results were also robust to the removal of some control variables, such as firm 
size and age - which may capture debt capacity - from our NI equations.  We also obtained 
similar results to those reported in the paper when focusing on persistent NI, which we 
defined as NI taking place for at least three years. Lastly, we adopted the linear probability 
model in estimation, and this too yielded results consistent with our main findings. For 
brevity, these additional results are not reported but are available on request. 
 
IX. Conclusion 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper represents a first attempt to investigate negative 
investment behavior in China. The issue is of particular interest because China’s industrial 
sector exhibits a high rate of investment which co-exists with a high frequency of negative 
investment. We have explained this interesting fact using a large and comprehensive panel 
data set of mainly unlisted industrial firms over the period 2000-2007. 
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Our descriptive statistics show dramatic structural changes over the sample period, 
with the share of the state sector declining and that of the non-state sector expanding. SOEs 
remain the poor performers of the economy: they have the highest negative investment rate, 
lowest profitability, lowest efficiency, slowest growth rate, and the highest leverage rate. This 
suggests that the state sector has been cushioned by favorable access to credit and state 
subsidies. By contrast, the private and foreign sectors, which contain the most efficient, 
profitable, and fast-growing firms, have less access to the formal financial system. Collective 
firms exhibit good financial performance and improvements in productivity, but their growth 
prospects are not comparable to those of private and foreign firms.  
Given this huge heterogeneity in firms owned by different agents, our study of 
negative investment in China required separate analysis of the different ownership groups. 
Specifically, we tested whether firms owned by different agents have negative investment for 
different reasons. Our results support the explanation that private firms do so in order to raise 
capital, whereas negative investment by SOEs can be explained largely by inefficiency. 
Rapid economic growth counterweighs both effects, especially in the private and foreign 
sectors.  
Our paper supports and complements that of Song et al. (2011). Both account for the 
process of China’s rapid industrial growth viewed in terms of differences between the public 
and private sectors in productivity, profitability, saving and funding. Both papers argue that 
its pace depends on the extent of those differences, the degree of product market competition, 
the amount of subsidies to ailing state-owned enterprises, and the ability of privately-owned 
enterprises to generate saving for investment. Our own further contribution is to highlight the 
different roles of negative investment in that transition process. 
Our findings have an important policy implication: the limited access to external 
finance of the non-state sector is the most likely source of negative investment for private 
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firms. This suggests the need for further reform of the financial system, which has lagged 
behind most other economic reforms in China. For instance, banks should apply commercial 
lending criteria to all types of firms in order to provide and promote efficient financial market 
competition. The recent financial reforms discussed in Borst and Lardy (2015) are steps in 
the right direction. 
Our study has limitations. The dataset does not allow us to observe the exact timing 
and amount of asset sales or divestment by firms, making interpretations difficult. The extent 
to which our findings can be generalized to all sectors of the Chinese economy may also be 
questioned, owing to the fact that only manufacturing and mining enterprises are covered in 
the NBS dataset. Ideally, future research should be extended to those less mature, faster 
growing sectors of the economy such as the more dynamic parts of the service sector, which 
have fueled China’s economic growth over the last few years. Finally, the lack of segment-
level data makes it impossible to test hypotheses of divestment such as the focus explanation 
and liquidity explanation, which may also be important in determining firms’ negative 
investment behavior. 
The relatively high negative investment rate observed among listed companies in 
other Asian economies is unlikely to have the same explanation as in China. A full analysis 
of the reasons behind the relatively high negative investment rates observed in other countries 
goes beyond the scope of this paper and is in the agenda for future research.   
 
Data Appendix  
Table A1 provides definitions of all variables used in the paper. Table A2 presents the 
distribution of observations by ownership over time. Table A3 describes the structure of our 
panel. Table A4 provides additional descriptive statistics of key variables for firms with 
positive and negative investment. 
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TABLE 1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF KEY VARIABLES 
 
 Full 
sample 
SOEs Collective 
firms 
Private 
firms 
Foreign 
firms 
 
Investment vs divestment 
 
fixed investment/tangible fixed assets  0.088 
(0.064) 
0.025 
(0.012) 
0.062 
(0.044) 
0.100 
(0.079) 
0.088 
(0.064) 
negative investment ratio 0.321 
(0.000) 
0.434 
(0.000) 
0.355 
(0.000) 
0.310 
(0.000) 
0.297 
(0.000) 
negative investment/tangible fixed assets -0.222 
(-0.051) 
-0.164 
(-0.043) 
-0.224 
(-0.050) 
-0.236 
(-0.052) 
-0.210 
(-0.048) 
 
Independent variables in the baseline model 
 
cash flow 0.364 
(0.209) 
0.151 
(0.076) 
0.408 
(0.218) 
0.364 
(0.211) 
0.412 
(0.244) 
leverage 0.572 
(0.584) 
0.633 
(0.645) 
0.591 
(0.602) 
0.598 
(0.616) 
0.477 
(0.472) 
TFP 3.773 
(2.536) 
3.062 
(1.916) 
3.179 
(2.228) 
3.439 
(2.379) 
4.969 
(3.308) 
sales growth 0.096 
(0.094) 
0.038 
(0.044) 
0.072 
(0.069) 
0.112 
(0.108) 
0.084 
(0.086) 
 
Control variables in the baseline model 
 
firm size 5.544 
(5.432) 
5.879 
(5.917) 
5.236 
(5.151) 
5.370 
(5.237) 
5.951 
(5.888) 
firm age 2.274 
(2.197) 
3.137 
(3.465) 
2.685 
(2.639) 
2.152 
(2.079) 
2.142 
(2.197) 
tangibility 0.322 
(0.294) 
0.399 
(0.381) 
0.314 
(0.276) 
0.322 
(0.295) 
0.302 
(0.280) 
export 0.377 
(0.000) 
0.161 
(0.000) 
0.148 
(0.000) 
0.295 
(0.000) 
0.729 
(1.000) 
      
Observations 270,691 19,264 21,139 157,606 61,229 
 
Note. Mean and median (in parentheses) values of each variable are reported. The negative investment ratio measures the 
proportion of firms that have negative fixed asset investment. The negative investment to tangible fixed assets ratio measures 
the mean/median ratio of the amount of negative investment to tangible fixed assets for those observations characterized by 
negative investment. All other variables are defined in Table A1 in the Data Appendix. 
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TABLE 2 
BASELINE MODEL (PROBIT ESTIMATION) 
 
 
SOEs Collective 
firms 
Private firms Foreign firms 
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.079*** -0.054*** -0.038*** -0.026*** 
 
(0.018) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.053*** -0.008 -0.059*** 0.012 
 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.006) (0.009) 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.021*** -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.006*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.068*** -0.071*** -0.090*** -0.100*** 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.005) 
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.005 0.009** 0.004** -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) 
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 0.010* 0.011* 0.029*** 0.056*** 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) 
𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 0.336*** 0.271*** 0.300*** 0.249*** 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.008) (0.014) 
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 0.003 -0.005 -0.031*** -0.051*** 
 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.003) (0.005) 
Observations 19,264 21,139 157,606 61,229 
 
Note. The dependent variable is a binary variable which takes value of one if the firm divests, and zero otherwise The 
table reports marginal effects and cluster-robust standard errors (in parentheses). Time dummies, industry dummies 
and their interactions are included in estimation but not reported. Also see Note to Table 1. 
*Significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 1%. 
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TABLE 3 
BASELINE MODEL (TOBIT ESTIMATION) 
 
 
SOEs Collective 
firms 
Private firms Foreign firms 
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 
-0.063*** -0.051*** -0.031*** -0.021*** 
 
(0.014) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 
0.012 -0.035*** -0.061*** 0.006 
 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.005) (0.008) 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 
-0.015*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.005*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 
-0.034*** -0.034*** -0.057*** -0.067*** 
 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.005) 
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 
-0.003 0.008** 0.004*** -0.007*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) 
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
0.003 0.007 0.021*** 0.052*** 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) 
𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 
0.228*** 0.233*** 0.277*** 0.236*** 
 
(0.018) (0.017) (0.007) (0.011) 
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 
0.009 0.006 -0.021*** -0.042*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) 
Observations 19,264 21,139 157,606 61,229 
 
Note. The dependent variable is a censored variable which is equal to zero if the firm does not divest, and 
takes the value of the actual amount divested otherwise. The table reports marginal effects and cluster-
robust standard errors (in parentheses). Time dummies, industry dummies and their interactions are 
included in estimation but not reported. Also see Note to Table 1. 
*Significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 1%. 
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TABLE 4 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF ALTERNATIVE VARIABLES USED IN THE 
ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 
 Full 
sample 
SOEs Collective 
firms 
Private 
firms 
Foreign 
firms 
Financing variable      
   net profit 0.238 
(0.086) 
0.063 
(0.009) 
0.283 
(0.092) 
0.244 
(0.095) 
0.261 
(0.100) 
Efficiency variables      
   value added per worker 0.777 
(0.471) 
0.477 
(0.277) 
0.692 
(0.415) 
0.781 
(0.494) 
0.882 
(0.498) 
   productivity 2.856 
(1.854) 
1.504 
(0.868) 
2.514 
(1.558) 
2.914 
(1.960) 
3.223 
(2.051) 
Growth variables      
   value added growth 0.089 
(0.086) 
-0.001 
(0.026) 
0.042 
(0.047) 
0.108 
(0.099) 
0.094 
(0.091) 
   asset growth 0.077 
(0.042) 
0.008 
(-0.005) 
0.044 
(0.014) 
0.097 
(0.058) 
0.065 
(0.041) 
   employment growth 0.015 
(0.000) 
-0.040 
(-0.015) 
-0.012 
(0.000) 
0.017 
(0.000) 
0.038 
(0.000) 
   TFP growth 0.079 
(0.073) 
0.036 
(0.044) 
0.049 
(0.051) 
0.089 
(0.081) 
0.082 
(0.074) 
      
Observations 270,691 19,264 21,139 157,606 61,229 
 
Note. Mean and median (in parentheses) values of each variable are reported. All variables are defined in Table A1 
in the Data Appendix. 
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TABLE 5 
ROBUSTNESS TEST: USING DIFFERENT FINANCING EFFICIENCY, AND 
GROWTH VARIABLES (PROBIT ESTIMATION) 
 
 SOEs Collective 
firms 
Private firms Foreign 
firms 
 
Alternative financing variable  
 
𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1  -0.068*** -0.038*** -0.023*** -0.018*** 
 (0.018) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) 
Observations 19,264 21,139 157,606 61,229 
 
Alternative efficiency variables  
 
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1  -0.023*** 0.001 0.006*** 0.005*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations 
 
23,739 21,709 163,095 65,815 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  -0.005** 0.003* 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 23,739 21,709 163,095 65,815 
 
Alternative growth variables  
 
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1  -0.000 -0.008 -0.034*** -0.027*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) 
Observations 
 
16,468 18,968 148,823 55,385 
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1  -0.164*** -0.060*** -0.107*** -0.088*** 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.004) (0.007) 
Observations 
 
19,277 21,142 157,632 61,220 
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1  -0.076*** -0.096*** -0.109*** -0.129*** 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.004) (0.007) 
Observations 
 
19,246 21,127 157,550 61,183 
𝑇𝐹𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1  0.002 -0.003 -0.023*** -0.017*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) 
Observations 15,500 18,186 142,208 51,665 
 
Note. The dependent variable is a censored variable which is equal to zero if the firm does not divest, and takes the 
value of the actual amount divested otherwise. The table reports marginal effects and cluster-robust standard errors 
(in parentheses). Time dummies, industry dummies and their interactions are included in estimation but not 
reported. For each model, we only report the marginal effects associated with the new variables to save space. Also 
see Note to Table 1. 
*Significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 1%. 
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TABLE 6 
ROBUSTNESS TEST: USING INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES (PROBIT 
ESTIMATION) 
 
 
SOEs Collective firms Private firms Foreign firms 
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
-0.125*** 
 
-0.065*** 
 
-0.049*** 
 
-0.046*** 
 
(0.042) (0.022) (0.012) (0.016) 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
0.081*** 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.073*** 
 
0.018 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.009) (0.013) 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
-0.027*** 
 
-0.018*** 
 
-0.013*** 
 
-0.007*** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
-0.077*** 
 
-0.083*** 
 
-0.086*** 
 
-0.101*** 
 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.004) (0.007) 
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
0.005 
 
0.010 
 
0.008*** 
 
-0.002 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) 
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
 
0.007 
 
0.006 
 
0.023*** 
 
0.046*** 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.006) 
𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
0.293*** 
 
0.224*** 
 
0.208*** 
 
0.181*** 
 
(0.033) (0.031) (0.013) (0.025) 
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
-0.011 
 
0.010 
 
-0.032*** 
 
-0.050*** 
 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005) 
Wald test of 
exogeneity 
 
91.19 
{0.000} 
 
25.95 
{0.000} 
 
360.07 
{0.000} 
 
68.16 
{0.000} 
Observations 
 
12,483  
 
14,654  
 
112,695  
 
42,614  
 
Note. The dependent variable is a binary variable which takes value of one if the firm divests, and zero otherwise The table 
reports marginal effects and cluster-robust standard errors (in parentheses). Time dummies, industry dummies and their 
interactions are included in estimation but not reported. All financing, efficiency, growth, asset tangibility, export, and firm 
size variables are instrumented using their own values lagged twice. This explains the smaller number of observations in 
this table compared to the previous ones. p-values of the Wald test of exogeneity of the instruments are shown in curly 
brackets. Also see Note to Table 1. 
*Significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 1%. 
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TABLE 7 
FURTHER ROBUSTNESS TEST FOR THE EFFICIENCY EXPLANATION: CHANGES IN TFP AFTER A FIRM MAKES A NI 
 
 
G1: Divesti,t=1;   Divesti,t+1=0 G2: Divesti,t=0;   Divesti,t+1=0 
Comparing  
G1 and G2 
 
Mean Median 
Change in 
Mean 
Change in 
Median Mean Median 
Change in 
Mean 
Change in 
Median 
Change in 
Mean 
Change in 
Median 
TFP(SOEs, year-1) 2.631 1.757   3.49 2.349     
TFP(SOEs, year+1) 3.098 2.019 17.7%*** 14.9%*** 4.024 2.645 15.3%*** 12.6%*** 2.4% 2.3% 
TFP(Collective firms, year-1) 2.729 1.982   3.205 2.397     
TFP(Collective firms, year+1) 3.198 2.239 17.2%*** 13.0%*** 3.725 2.737 16.2%*** 14.2%*** 1.0% -1.2% 
TFP(Private firms, year-1) 2.726 1.943   3.228 2.298     
TFP(Private firms, year+1) 3.389 2.372 24.3%*** 22.1%*** 4.03 2.82 24.8%*** 22.7%*** -0.5% -0.6% 
TFP(Foreign firms, year-1) 3.976 2.645   4.823 3.256     
TFP(Foreign firms, year+1) 4.805 3.212 20.9%*** 21.4%*** 5.806 3.971 20.4%*** 22.0%*** 0.5% -0.5% 
 
Note. This table presents total factor productivity (TFP) in the year preceding (year -1) and the year following (year +1) the year in which a NI is made (G1) or not made 
(G2). We provide the t-test for differences in means and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for differences in medians of TFP between year -1 and year +1.   
*Significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 1%. 
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TABLE 8 
FURTHER ROBUSTNESS TEST FOR FINANCING EXPLANATION: 
ADDING AN INTERACTION BETWEEN LEVERAGE AND A HIGH 
CASH FLOW DUMMY (PROBIT ESTIMATION) 
 
 
SOEs Collective 
firms 
Private firms Foreign 
firms 
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.031** -0.044*** -0.026*** -0.018*** 
 
(0.015) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.029* -0.031* -0.072*** 0.003 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.006) (0.009) 
𝐶𝐹_ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.106*** -0.097*** -0.079*** -0.045*** 
 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) 
𝐶𝐹_ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.019 -0.013 -0.001 -0.004 
 
(0.031) (0.038) (0.013) (0.020) 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.015*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.006*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.060*** -0.064*** -0.084*** -0.096*** 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.005) 
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.010*** 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) 
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 0.005 0.006 0.029*** 0.058*** 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) 
𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 0.288*** 0.237*** 0.273*** 0.237*** 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.008) (0.013) 
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 0.001 -0.004 -0.030*** -0.050*** 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.005) 
Observations 19,264 21,139 157,606 61,229 
 
Note. The dependent variable is a binary variable which takes value of one if the firm divests, and 
zero otherwise. The table reports marginal effects and cluster-robust standard errors (in 
parentheses).  𝐶𝐹_ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ is a dummy variable equal to 1 in a given year if a firm’s cash flow lies in 
the top three quarters of the distribution of the cash flow of all firms belonging to the same industry 
as that firm in that year, and 0 otherwise. The marginal effects associated with the CF_high 
*Leverage interaction are computed based on the difference between the average marginal effects 
for Leverage evaluated in turn at  𝐶𝐹_ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ =1 and  𝐶𝐹_ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ =0.  Time dummies, industry 
dummies and their interactions are included in estimation but not reported. Also see Note to Table 
1. 
*Significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 1%. 
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TABLE 9(A) 
FURTHER ROBUSTNESS TEST: USING A DIFFERENT OWNERSHIP 
CLASSIFICATION (PROBIT ESTIMATION) 
 
 
SOEs Collective 
firms 
Private firms Foreign firms 
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.087*** -0.050*** -0.053*** -0.032*** 
 
(0.016) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.039** -0.011 -0.045*** 0.005 
 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012) 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.018*** -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.007*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.077*** -0.058*** -0.104*** -0.103*** 
 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) 
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.001 0.002 0.005** -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 0.005 0.018*** 0.026*** 0.031*** 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.009) 
𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 0.345*** 0.316*** 0.254*** 0.241*** 
 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.013) (0.018) 
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.004 -0.016* -0.028*** -0.051*** 
 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) 
Observations 22,373 26,245 59,086 37,066 
 
Note. The dependent variable is a binary variable which takes value of one if the firm divests, and zero 
otherwise. The table reports marginal effects and cluster-robust standard errors (in parentheses). Time 
dummies, industry dummies and their interactions are included in estimation but not reported. The 
ownership classification is made on the basis of ownership shares immediately before the sample period 
begins (in 2000). Also see Note to Table 1.   
*Significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 1%. 
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TABLE 9(B) 
FURTHER ROBUSTNESS TEST: USING A DIFFERENT OWNERSHIP 
CLASSIFICATION (PROBIT ESTIMATION) 
 
 
SOEs Collective 
firms 
Private firms Foreign firms 
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.084*** -0.055*** -0.037*** -0.027*** 
 
(0.017) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.051*** -0.021 -0.060*** 0.013 
 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.006) (0.009) 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.018*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.006*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.069*** -0.071*** -0.089*** -0.102*** 
 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.003) (0.005) 
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.004 0.010** 0.004*** -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) 
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.032*** 0.053*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 0.342*** 0.275*** 0.302*** 0.250*** 
 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.008) (0.013) 
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.003 -0.024*** -0.030*** -0.050*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.005) 
Observations 21,139 24,976 160,378 60,508 
 
Note. The dependent variable is a binary variable which takes value of one if the firm divests, and zero 
otherwise. The table reports marginal effects and cluster-robust standard errors (in parentheses). Time 
dummies, industry dummies and their interactions are included in estimation but not reported. The 
ownership classification is made on the basis of the share of capital paid-in by various owner categories 
in each year. Also see Note to Table 1. 
*Significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 1%. 
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TABLE A1 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Variables Definitions 
 
Dependent variable in the pooled probit model with cluster-robust standard errors 
 
NI  
 
Binary variable which takes value of one if the firm has negative investment at time t (Ii,t <0), 
and zero otherwise. Ii,t represents fixed investment at time t and is defined as the firm’s book 
value of tangible fixed assets at time t (Ki,t) minus the book value of tangible fixed assets at time 
t-1 (Ki,t-1) plus depreciation at time t (Depi,t), i.e. Ii,t=Ki,t - Ki,t-1+Depi,t . 
 
 
Dependent variable in the pooled tobit model with cluster-robust standard errors 
 
NI 
 
Censored variable equal to zero if the firm does not have negative investment (Ii,t  0), and equal 
to the actual amount divested, otherwise. 
 
Independent variables (in both the baseline model and robustness tests) 
 
Financial variables 
 
 
cash flow 
 
Ratio of cash flow (defined as the sum of the firm’s net income and depreciation) to total 
tangible fixed assets. 
leverage Ratio of total debt to total assets. 
net profit Ratio of net income to total tangible fixed assets. 
 
Efficiency variables 
 
 
TFP 
 
Total Factor Productivity calculated using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method.  
value added per worker Ratio of real value added to number of employees. 
productivity Average labor productivity: ratio of real sales to number of employees. 
 
Growth variables 
 
 
sales growth 
 
Growth rate of real sales 
value added growth Growth rate of real value added 
asset growth Growth rate of total real assets 
employment growth Growth rate of number of employees 
TFP growth Growth rate of TFP 
 
Control variables 
 
 
 
firm size 
 
Natural logarithm of the book value of total real assets (expressed in thousands of RMB yuan) 
firm age Natural logarithm of firm age  
tangibility Ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets. 
export  Dummy variable equal to one if the firm exports, and zero otherwise 
high cash flow dummy Dummy variable equal to 1 in a given year if a firm’s cash flow lies in the top three quarters of 
the distribution of the cash flow of all firms belonging to the same industry as that firm in that 
year, and zero otherwise. 
  
 
Note. All variables (except dummy variables) are deflated using provincial ex-factory producer price indices taken from various issues of 
the China Statistical Yearbook. 
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TABLE A2 
DISTRIBUTION OF OBSERVATIONS BY OWNERSHIP 
 
 SOEs Collective 
firms 
Private firms Foreign 
firms 
Mixed 
ownership 
Total 
2000 11.80 11.06 52.04 19.49 5.61 100.00 
2001 9.49 9.62 58.00 18.20 4.69 100.00 
2002 8.65 8.90 60.89 17.23 4.33 100.00 
2003 7.57 8.04 63.36 17.25 3.77 100.00 
2004 7.36 7.83 63.56 17.53 3.71 100.00 
2005 6.75 7.62 64.42 17.47 3.73 100.00 
2006 6.27 7.21 65.18 17.69 3.65 100.00 
2007 5.28 6.93 66.25 17.99   3.55 100.00 
Average 7.62 8.20 62.42 17.75 4.02 100.00 
 
Note. All numbers in this table are percentages.  The ownership classification is based on the majority rule. 
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TABLE A3 
STRUCTURE OF THE UNBALANCED PANEL USED IN ESTIMATION 
 
Year Number of 
observations 
Percent Cumulative 
2001 17,744 6.56 6.56 
2002 24,830 9.17 15.73 
2003 35,178 13.00 28.72 
2004 43,031 15.90 44.62 
2005 51,877 19.16 63.78 
2006 50,514 18.66 82.45 
2007 47,517 17.55 100.00 
Total 270,691 100.00  
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TABLE A4 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF KEY VARIABLES FOR FIRMS WITH NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE INVESTMENT 
 
 Full sample SOEs Collective firms Private firms Foreign firms 
 NI PI p-value NI PI p-value NI PI p-value NI PI p value NI PI p-value 
Panel A. Variables in the baseline model 
fixed investment/tangible fixed assets  -0.222 
(-0.051) 
0.234 
(0.161) 
0.000 -0.164 
(-0.043) 
0.171 
(0.098) 
0.000 -0.224 
(-0.050) 
0.218 
(0.141) 
0.000 -0.236 
(-0.052) 
0.252 
(0.183) 
0.000 -0.210 
(-0.048) 
0.214 
(0.141) 
0.000 
cash flow 0.330 
(0.178) 
0.379 
(0.222) 
0.000 0.101 
(0.046) 
0.189 
(0.101) 
0.000 0.369 
(0.177) 
0.430 
(0.240) 
0.000 0.353 
(0.194) 
0.369 
(0.219) 
0.002 0.361 
(0.210) 
0.433 
(0.260) 
0.000 
Leverage 0.573 
(0.585) 
0.570 
(0.584) 
0.000 0.652 
(0.669) 
0.618 
(0.629) 
0.000 0.600 
(0.613) 
0.587 
(0.596) 
0.000 0.593 
(0.609) 
0.601 
(0.620) 
0.000 0.475 
(0.468) 
0.478 
(0.474) 
0.000 
TFP 3.190 
(2.148) 
4.046 
(2.743) 
0.000 2.468 
(1.535) 
3.507 
(2.244) 
0.000 2.735 
(1.893) 
3.419 
(2.438) 
0.000 2.965 
(2.071) 
3.651 
(2.532) 
0.000 4.225 
(2.773) 
5.282 
(3.547) 
0.000 
sales growth 0.024 
(0.036) 
0.129 
(0.120) 
0.000 -0.009 
(0.007) 
0.075 
(0.071) 
0.000 0.016 
(0.028) 
0.102 
(0.090) 
0.000 0.038 
(0.048) 
0.146 
(0.135) 
0.000 0.012 
(0.027) 
0.115 
(0.111) 
0.000 
firm size 5.402 
(5.293) 
5.611 
(5.499) 
0.000 5.729 
(5.745) 
5.995 
(6.046) 
0.000 5.143 
(5.061) 
5.287 
(5.201) 
0.000 5.217 
(5.087) 
5.439 
(5.305) 
0.000 5.799 
(5.706) 
6.016 
(5.958) 
0.000 
firm age 2.343 
(2.302) 
2.242 
(2.197) 
0.000 3.177 
(3.496) 
3.106 
(3.434) 
0.000 2.716 
(2.708) 
2.668 
(2.639) 
0.000 2.191 
(2.079) 
2.135 
(2.079) 
0.000 2.181 
(2.302) 
2.126 
(2.197) 
0.000 
Tangibility 0.311 
(0.280) 
0.327 
(0.301) 
0.000 0.399 
(0.382) 
0.398 
(0.380) 
0.000 0.303 
(0.264) 
0.319 
(0.283) 
0.000 0.306 
(0.275) 
0.329 
(0.303) 
0.000 0.287 
(0.260) 
0.309 
(0.288) 
0.000 
Export 0.333 
(0.000) 
0.397 
(0.000) 
0.000 0.150 
(0.000) 
0.170 
(0.000) 
0.000 0.144 
(0.000) 
0.151 
(0.000) 
0.036 0.258 
(0.000) 
0.312 
(0.000) 
0.000 0.694 
(1.000) 
0.744 
(1.000) 
0.000 
Observations 86957 183734  8364 10900  7505 13634  48925 108681  18201 43028  
Panel B. Variables in robustness tests 
net profit 0.214 
(0.062) 
0.250 
(0.098) 
0.000 0.028 
(0.001) 
0.090 
(0.018) 
0.000 0.258 
(0.065) 
0.297 
(0.108) 
0.000 0.239 
(0.079) 
0.247 
(0.101) 
0.821 0.220 
(0.074) 
0.278 
(0.112) 
0.000 
value added per worker 0.718 
(0.421) 
0.806 
(0.495) 
0.000 0.401 
(0.233) 
0.536 
(0.314) 
0.000 0.623 
(0.369) 
0.729 
(0.441) 
0.000 0.741 
(0.454) 
0.800 
(0.512) 
0.000 0.837 
(0.458) 
0.901 
(0.516) 
0.000 
Productivity 2.656 
(1.666) 
2.951 
(1.946) 
0.000 1.301 
(0.749) 
1.659 
(0.961) 
0.000 2.299 
(1.428) 
2.633 
(1.634) 
0.000 2.761 
(1.803) 
2.983 
(2.028) 
0.000 3.118 
(1.906) 
3.268 
(2.115) 
0.000 
value added growth -0.026 
(0.002) 
0.143 
(0.123) 
0.000 -0.095 
(-0.036) 
0.069 
(0.072) 
0.000 -0.054 
(-0.017) 
0.095 
(0.081) 
0.000 -0.007 
(0.015) 
0.159 
(0.136) 
0.000 -0.023 
(0.001) 
0.143 
(0.124) 
0.000 
asset growth -0.031 
(-0.030) 
0.128 
(0.085) 
0.000 -0.062 
(-0.049) 
0.063 
(0.034) 
0.000 -0.047 
(-0.040) 
0.093 
(0.052) 
0.000 -0.022 
(-0.024) 
0.151 
(0.105) 
0.000 -0.030 
(-0.026) 
0.106 
(0.076) 
0.000 
employment growth -0.031 
(0.000) 
0.037 
(0.000) 
0.000 -0.065 
(-0.026) 
-0.021 
(-0.007) 
0.000 -0.046 
(0.000) 
0.007 
(0.000) 
0.000 -0.029 
(0.000) 
0.038 
(0.000) 
0.000 -0.015 
(0.000) 
0.060 
(0.017) 
0.000 
TFP growth 0.051 
(0.062) 
0.092 
(0.079) 
0.000 0.002 
(0.027) 
0.061 
(0.055) 
0.000 0.025 
(0.041) 
0.062 
(0.057) 
0.000 0.067 
(0.074) 
0.098 
(0.084) 
0.000 0.047 
(0.057) 
0.096 
(0.082) 
0.000 
Observations 86957 183734  8364 10900  7505 13634  48925 108681  18201 43028  
 
Note. Mean and median (in parentheses) values of each variable are reported. All variables are defined in Table A1 in the Data Appendix. NI refers to observations with negative fixed investment. PI refers to 
observations with positive fixed investment. p-value denote the p-values associated with the t-tests for equality of means of the reported variables between firm-years with NI and PI.     
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FIGURE 1  
SHARE OF FIRMS OWNED BY DIFFERENT AGENTS IN TOTAL INVESTMENT 
IN FIXED ASSETS 
 
Data source. China Statistical Yearbook (Various issues). 
  
Note. Individual firms include family firms and small private businesses. Other types of ownership 
consist of joint-ownership enterprises, shareholding companies, joint-venture enterprises, and foreign 
firms.  
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 Focusing on aggregate data over the same time period covered by our data (2000-2007), the 
World Bank (2019) reports the following average values of gross fixed capital formation 
(GFCF) to GDP ratio (manufacturing value added over GDP): 41% (32%) in China; 23% 
(24%) in Singapore; 17% (23%) in the Philippines; 33% (25%) in South Korea; 23% (26%) 
in Malaysia; 25% (31%) in Thailand. These statistics show that China has by far the largest 
GFCF to GDP ratio among these countries, and that this is driven by the manufacturing 
sector. In fact, the only countries with GFCF to GDP ratio higher than China over the period 
2000-2007 are India (42%), Latvia (42%), Qatar (46%), and Suriname (46%). This confirms 
that China is very unusual if not unique. It should, however, be noted that the gross capital 
formation does not correspond exactly to the investment rate, but is a broader measure. It 
consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the 
level of inventories. Fixed assets include land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so 
on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and 
the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial 
and industrial buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms to meet temporary or 
unexpected fluctuations in production or sales, and "work in progress." Net acquisitions of 
valuables are also considered capital formation. 
2 By contrast, Brandt and Zhou (2010) show that the contribution of the high investment rate 
to growth in China was quite limited. In fact, various estimates of the causal effect of 
investment on growth produce results of different strength, according to the methodology and 
data used (e.g. Brandt and Zhou, 2010; Knight and Ding, 2012, ch.6; Guariglia and Yang, 
2016). 
3 The aggregate investment rate is defined as the aggregate investment to capital ratio. The 
rate of negative investment is defined as the percentage of companies in the sample showing 
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negative investment. We report data for the period 2000-2007, as our own empirical analysis 
is based on that period. See endnote 16 for details on why more recent data could not be used. 
4 These data are also taken from Thomson Financial and refer to listed companies over the 
period 2000-2007.   
5 According to the World Bank (2019), over the period 2000-2007, there were only 1530 
listed companies in China, whereas the full National Bureau Statistics (NBS) dataset, which 
we use in this paper, contains over 300,000 companies. This suggests that listed companies 
make up less than 0.5% of the total. Unfortunately, our dataset does not allow separate 
identification of publicly listed companies, as their legal identification numbers were changed 
when they went public (Liu and Xiao, 2004). 
6 To the best of our knowledge, data on unlisted firms for other Asian countries are not 
available. Moreover, unlisted companies are likely to play a smaller role in those countries 
than in China, as the listed sector is much larger in those countries. For instance, according to 
World Bank (2019), the average number of listed companies per 1,000,000 people over the 
period 2000-2007 was only 0.99 in China. The corresponding figures for other Asian 
countries were: 102.31 in Singapore; 2.81 in the Philippines; 31.58 in South Korea; 36.99 
Malaysia; and 6.78 in Thailand. 
7 A sell-off occurs when a firm sells a part of its assets to another firm. A spin-off takes place 
when ownership of the divested asset is transferred to a new company formed by a pro-rata 
distribution of equity shares in the new company to current shareholders. An equity carve-out 
occurs when ownership of the divested assets is transferred to a new company formed by the 
issue of equity shares in the new company to the public. A management buyout means that 
the incumbent management team buys all the equity shares of either a firm or a subsidiary 
from current shareholders. 
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8 A partial sell-off is the sale of a subsidiary, division, or other operating assets; a total sell-
off (or liquidation) occurs when a firm sells all its assets.  
9 It should be noted that all these explanations are not mutually exclusive. For instance, when 
it divests, a firm may be responding to both the efficiency and the financing motive. 
10 The reform was announced in 1999. The meaning of the slogan is that small SOEs were to 
be closed or privatized, whereas large SOEs were to be merged into large industrial 
conglomerates and the control over these conglomerates was to be consolidated by the central 
and local governments.  
11 The more recent reforms to the financial system documented in Borst and Lardy (2015) 
also contributed to making finance more accessible to all companies: Lardy (2014) 
documents a significant increase in the flow of loans to private companies in recent years. 
12 As more than 99% of the firms in our dataset are unlisted, we are unable to include Tobin’s 
Q in our model. 
13 Definitions of all variables are presented in Table A1 in the Data Appendix. 
14 In the absence of Tobin’s Q, time dummies interacted with industry dummies, or, more 
specifically, time-varying demand shocks at the industry level, also contribute to capturing 
investment opportunities (Brown and Petersen, 2009; Brown, Fazzari and Petersen, 2009; 
Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy, 2010; Guariglia et al., 2011).  
15 Although pooled probit and tobit models do not take into account the panel nature of the 
dataset, they provide consistent estimators of relevant parameters. We use a robust estimator 
of the covariance matrix that allows for clustering within firms to ensure appropriate 
inference. An important characteristic of pooled estimators is that they do not require the 
regressors to be strictly exogenous and can accommodate predetermined variables 
(Wooldridge, 2002). This makes the estimators more robust compared to random-effects 
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models, which assume strict exogeneity. Our results were robust to using random-effects 
probit and tobit estimators. 
16 It was, unfortunately, not possible to use more recent waves of the NBS dataset in our 
analysis, owing to the fact that key variables such as depreciations are no longer provided 
after 2007. 
17 The rationale for dividing foreign investors into those from Hong Kong, Macao, and 
Taiwan, and those from other parts of the world is that the former capture the so-called 
‘round-tripping’ foreign direct investment, whereby domestic firms may register as foreign 
invested firms from nearby regions to take advantage of the benefits (such as tax and legal 
benefits) granted to foreign invested firms (Huang, 2003). 
18 Legal entities represent a mix of various domestic institutions, such as industrial 
enterprises, construction and real estate development companies, transportation and power 
companies, security companies, trust and investment companies, foundations and funds, 
banks, technology and research institutions etc. 
19 Collective firms are typically owned collectively by communities in urban or rural areas. 
The latter are known as township and village enterprises (TVEs). 
20 Within this category, firms owned by individuals represent about two thirds of the total. As 
firms owned by legal entities include firms owned by state legal entities, one could question 
their inclusion in the private category. One reason for including them is that while the state’s 
primary interest is political (i.e. aimed at maintaining employment levels or control over 
certain strategic industries), legal entities are profit-oriented (Wei, Xie and Zhang, 2005). 
Since our dataset does not allow us to discriminate between state and non-state legal entities, 
we are unable to exclude the former from the private category. However, our results were 
generally robust to excluding firms owned by legal entities from the private category.   
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21 Descriptive statistics calculated for different industries showed that the percentages of 
firms with negative investment were not too different across industries, ranging from 27.8% 
in the transport industry to 37.3% in the petroleum industry. These statistics, which are not 
reported for brevity, suggest that negative investment is not concentrated in some shrinking 
industries, but is widespread. 
22 The difference in the leverage term between SOEs and private firms is statistically 
significant according to a two-sample mean-comparison test. 
23 All such differences are statistically significant at the 5% level according to a two-sample 
mean-comparison test. 
24 Note that all the differences between marginal effects across the four ownership groups 
discussed in the paper are statistically significant at the 5 percent significance level. 
25 We tested whether this is the case by running a system-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998) 
regression of cash flow on lagged cash flow, time, and industry dummies for various 
ownership groups, and found that SOEs display the highest coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable. These results, which are available upon request, confirm that cash flow is 
indeed more persistent for SOEs.  
26 See Section VIII. C for a further discussion of this point. 
27 These results were robust to including the marginal product of capital (MPK) in our model, 
as an additional measure of efficiency. However, we decided to omit MPK owing to its high 
correlation with cash flow. 
28 The larger negative marginal effect of private firms relative to SOEs might be the net effect 
of opposing forces: growth in the presence of credit constraints can be expected to increase 
their sale of assets, but investment in fixed assets (which is positively associated with cash 
flow and with TFP) might signal creditworthiness, and might therefore be positively related 
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to market forces, including current growth, suggesting a negative relationship between 
negative investment and growth.  
29 One could question whether these results might be driven by the high rate of firm entry and 
exit characterizing our sample period (Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang, 2012). To test 
whether this is the case, we re-estimated our baseline model on a balanced sample, which 
only contains firms, which have been present throughout the available period. The results, not 
reported for brevity but available upon request, were very similar to those reported in Table 
2. 
30 We also re-estimated our baseline specification for the full sample adding interactions of 
cash flow, leverage and TFP with both a dummy equal to one for SOEs and 0 otherwise, and 
a dummy equal to 1 for private firms and 0 otherwise. The marginal effects associated with 
these interactions respectively indicate the extent to which changes in cash 
flow/leverage/TFP affect the probability of undertaking negative investment for SOEs 
compared to all other firms, and for private firms compared to all other firms. We found that, 
in line with the  results reported in Table 2, relative to the base group made up by foreign and 
collective firms, the association between cash flow and the chance of showing negative 
investment was highest (in absolute value) for SOEs. A similar result was observed for the 
association between TFP and the probability of showing negative investment. Furthermore, 
leverage was negatively (positively) associated with the probability of undertaking negative 
investment for private firms (SOEs). The marginal effects associated with other control 
variables were also qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 2. These results are not 
reported for brevity but are available upon request. 
31 Specifically, we used a 50% threshold as an alternative way to define the high cash flow 
dummy (CF_high).  
